

SECURITY INFORMATION

AIR

NJAW-33

14 January 1953

Chief of Station, []

Chief, SR
Chief, NK

Operational/REDSOX

Further Development of Recruitment Through NOSTRIL.

REFERENCE- A) NJAA-31; B) NJAA-25; C) NJAA-22

1. Transmitted for [] information and action are headquarters views on questions brought up in the references.

2. Headquarters concurs that NOSTRIL has successfully completed the first phase of operational testing suggested in NJAW-13. The material submitted by the subject confirms the information available at headquarters, and indicates that the second testing phase should be instituted.

3. Arrangements are now being made for polygraphing in Beirut. These arrangements require [] Station to request a polygraph and Russian speaking operator to be sent from Frankfurt, Germany. This Russian-speaking operator was given a superficial briefing in Washington before his dispatch to Frankfurt, within security limitations, on NOSTRIL's general personality. He was also told that the final briefing on the points to be stressed in the polygraphing would be given to him by the [] Station Chief []. The polygraph operator should be therefore be told the following.

A. An explanation of the cover story told NOSTRIL per para 6, reference B.

B. That our main interest is NOSTRIL's possible connection with Soviet intelligence.

C. To determine whether or not NOSTRIL has been in contact with any Soviet organizations since 1943.

D. To determine whether or not NOSTRIL is working with the British Intelligence, or other intelligence organizations other than Soviet.

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4. In reference A, the question is raised of providing inducements for non-reactive agents. This problem was touched upon in a previous dispatch to [] However, we would like to suggest the following additional points. We would like to avoid dissipation of our assets in the USSR if possible. It is thus suggested that [] not bring up this topic at all unless he is directly asked by MOSTRAIL, in which case he should merely reply with a general statement to the effect that agents selected will be given all support and assistance necessary throughout the mission to assure the mission's success. Again, it is suggested that mention be made of the United States' humanitarian tradition (we do not send people to their deaths) and our vast training and technical resources. Past experience indicates that such an approach will normally suffice to reassure a strongly motivated agent candidate. In addition to the above, [] could point out that the type of work that we are offering provides the only available means for the Circassians to fight their traditional enemies, the Soviets.

5. In answer to the request in para 5, reference A, the prospective agent recruit should have the following general qualifications in addition to those outlined in para 7, NJA-W-13:

A. Better than average native intelligence. This does not imply that a candidate must have completed a certain level of education, although we prefer candidates who have completed the equivalent of high school education.

B. Common sense. This is closely related to basic intelligence. The agent will have to cope with many unforeseen circumstances after his arrival in the Soviet Union and he must be able to react in a logical manner.

C. Physical fitness, in order that he may withstand the rigors of a mission and an intensive training program. This means that he cannot have a serious physical disability, such as bad heart, tuberculosis, etc. If at all possible, headquarters would like to have candidates undergo a physical examination in Amman or Beirut, on some pretext or other, prior to the making of any commitment by us. If this is impossible, we will have to have candidates examined after removal from Jordan and assume their disposal if they have hidden physical defects. Please pouch your comments on this.

D. Be alert and possess good powers of observation. These qualities are necessary if we are to get accurate reporting of the things observed and heard by the agent while in the USSR.

E. Strong anti-Soviet motivation.

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6. The qualifications in para 5 above can be generally applied as a yardstick in measuring the worth of a potential agent candidate. We are, however, also on the lookout for an individual to enter the Soviet Union, rob a Soviet citizen of his documents and clothing and immediately return to a friendly area. Some of the above qualifications could be waived for a person capable of performing such a mission, ruthlessness and an extremely strong anti-Soviet motivation being the principal requirements.

7. Headquarters believes that the questioning of James Salis, suggested in reference C, would constitute a security risk that probably would not result in a contribution to our present knowledge about MOSTRIL. This stems from two considerations:

A. There are many Circassian emigres in the Patterson, N.J. area who also knew MOSTRIL in the past and have unwittingly given information on MOSTRIL's past activity and reputation. Their opinions, which stressed MOSTRIL's opportunistic character, have already been transmitted to the field.

B. In the small, tight, New Jersey Circassian community, any indicated interest in MOSTRIL would cause comment and undue attention detrimental to our operations.

8. As indicated above, headquarters believes it essential that ☐ go to Beirut prior to or simultaneous with MOSTRIL's arrival there, in order to give the polygraph operator an on-the-spot briefing. Will ☐ please confirm that he will be able to make this trip.

Distribution:

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21 Jan 53

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